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NOTES
TRADEMARK LAW-THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ApPLICATION
OF THE LANHAM ACT: THE FIRST CIRCUIT CUTS THE F AT FROM
THE VANITY FAIR TEST
INTRODUCTION

A.

The Hypothetical

Jimmy Collins is a professional baseball player who dreams of
major league stardom as he toils away in the minors. The typical
ten-hour bus trip to road games results in ample spare time, but he
keeps himself busy by learning how to shape pieces of leather into
baseball gloves. Eventually, his glove-making skills become so
good that he starts using his custom gloves for games and practice.
A struggling teammate looking for an edge asks Jimmy to custom
make him a glove, and Jimmy happily obliges. From this small be
ginning, word quickly spreads around the league that Jimmy Collins
can make anyone a custom glove for a small fee.
Although Jimmy still has hopes of playing in the major leagues,
his side business provides him with a steady stream of income. To
help generate new business, Jimmy proudly places his own logo
an interlocked J and C set within a diamond-on all his custom
gloves. Jimmy tells his agent about his glove business and the agent
helps him to register the trademark. Before long, at least one
player on every team in the league is using a Jimmy Collins Custom
Glove.
After five years of long bus trips, small towns, and fast food, a
torn rotator cuff ends Jimmy's playing career. He turns his focus
full-time to his glove-making venture and invests a substantial sum
of money into his growing brand. Business takes off and his gloves
are soon being used by many players throughout the minor and ma
jor leagues.
Looking to expand his business, Jimmy travels to the baseball
hotbed of the Dominican Republic to promote his product. He is
outraged when he discovers imitation Jimmy Collins Custom
Gloves scattered around Dominican ballparks. Jimmy has never
193
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sold a glove in the Dominican nor advertised his product there. He
finds out from some young ballplayers that Major League Baseball
games are broadcast in the Dominican and their favorite Domini
can superstar wears a Jimmy Collins Custom Glove. They tell
Jimmy of a salesman who comes around in a van selling what alleg
edly are Jimmy Collins Custom Gloves like the ones players wear
on television. Jimmy informs the youths their gloves are actually
poor-quality imitations and not authentic Jimmy Collins Custom
Gloves.
Jimmy believes the sale of poor-quality imitation gloves will
have a substantial negative impact on his business. In the short
term, it will be difficult for Jimmy to expand his business into the
Dominican with the imitation gloves on the market. In the long
term, the consumers who purchased the imitation gloves will for
ever associate the Jimmy Collins trademark with an inferior prod
uct. Consequently, even if Jimmy is able to expand successfully
into the Dominican, he has probably forever lost these potential
customers.
When Jimmy gets back to the United States, he consults an
intellectual-property attorney. The attorney suggests a suit for
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. However, since
the infringement was done in a foreign country, a federal court will
have to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction to hear the claim. More
over, the attorney tells Jimmy that even though the trademark in
fringement has arguably had a substantial effect on U.S. commerce,
federal courts probably have no jurisdiction over a claim of trade
mark infringement. Since the majority of jurisdictions do not per
mit claims when the infringer is a foreign citizen and the
infringement occurred in a foreign country, Jimmy is probably out
of luck.
B.

Trademarks and the Law

As the hypothetical suggests, trademarks play a valuable role
for consumers and producers alike. For consumers, trademarks are
a shorthand way to distinguish products. 1 For producers, trade
marks accumulate goodwill.2 They surround us in all forms of ad
1. See Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks
From Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 322-23 (1992); see infra
note 52 and accompanying text.
2. The goodwill associated with a trademark often becomes the centerpiece of a
business. 1 1. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 86
(Lawyers Co-Operative 1973) (describing four primary functions trademarks serve).
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vertising, help us find what we are looking for at the grocery store,
and sometimes even transcend their usual economic role and be
come a part of our common culture. 3
The U.S. economy has undergone two major evolutions that
have had a profound impact on U.S. trademark law. 4 First, the
many diverse regional economies that characterized this country
before the Industrial Revolution have merged into a single, unified,
national economy.s In response to this first evolution, the Lanham
Act6 was enacted to offer uniform trademark protection to national
brands. 7
The second evolution is ongoing. Our national economy is rap
idly changing into an international economy where, in many re
spects, products and information move as freely from country to
country as they do from state to state. 8 U.S. courts are now contin
ually faced with the task of protecting U.S. trademarks when they
are infringed upon in a global economy. However, courts are hesi
tant to expand the reach of U.S. law to cover the seemingly limitless
wrongs that are effectuated around the globe. 9
An example of this phenomenon is the Coca-Cola Company and its COKE brand. The
company hardly ever touts the taste of its COKE products, yet finds 60 percent of its
company value in this brand. Megan Richardson, Trade Marks and Language, 26 SYD
NEY L. REV. 193, 194 & n.9 (2004) (citing Interbrand, World's Most Famous Brands
Ranked by Interbrand 2001). Typically, companies that sell "consumer experience"
goods like soft drinks find the trademark to be one of their most valuable assets. See
Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 585, 595
n.79 (2002) (defining consumer experience goods as "relatively inexpensive, frequently
purchased products that a consumer typically will select by trial and error").
3. A single trademark may be used on a wide range of products, thus embedding
the trademark's "symbolic importance" into the bedrock of our society. When BMW
sells leather jackets and briefcases, or Coca-Cola sells t-shirts and Christmas ornaments,
consumers are not purchasing solely for the product, but also for the "experience" asso
ciated with the brand. See Drescher, supra note 1, at 332-38 (defining this phenomenon
as the "branded experience").
4. See infra notes 155-162 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 156.
6. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489,60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.c. §§ 1051-1127 (2000».
7. Bartholomew Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 200, 201-02, 206 (1949).
8. See generally Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark
Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (discussing the effects of market
globalization on trademark law and noting that e-commerce is "a forum that transcends
national boundaries and bears no physical location on 'Main Street' ").
9. As one commentator put it:
Experience shows that by the time the judicial machinery arrives at a place
where the pirate was yesterday, ready to deal with him, that elusive person has
moved forward and is still a little ahead-at a place where the courts will not
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Courts have been forced to grapple with the issue of when it is
proper to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant when
he infringes upon a trademark in a foreign country.1° The Supreme
Court addressed the issue once, but has been silent on the issue for
over fifty years. 11 Since then, the landscape of business, both here
and abroad, has drastically changed. Because of these changes, the
courts of appeals have been left to formulate their own tests to de
termine when the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
proper.12
This Note argues that in light of an ever-changing economic
backdrop, the "substantial effects test" adopted by the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit provides the necessary and proper
standard for determining when extraterritorial jurisdiction is war
ranted. Furthermore, this Note demonstrates that establishing ex
traterritorial jurisdiction in a global marketplace should be
dependent solely on the effects of the defendant's conduct, and not
upon the citizenship of the infringer or other comity considerations.
Part I of this Note explores the origins of trademark protection and
the enactment of the Lanham Act. This section details the provi
sions of the Lanham Act pertaining to extraterritorial jurisdiction,
as well as the Supreme Court's interpretation of those provisions.
It also examines three extraterritorial jurisdiction tests which the
first, second, and ninth circuits have developed. Part II of this Note
analyzes the circuits' tests in light of the drastic changes in eco
nomic conditions that have taken place in the last fifty years. Part
II then uses the Supreme Court's recent expansion of extraterrito
rial Sherman Act jurisdiction as a basis for expanding extraterrito
rial Lanham Act jurisdiction.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Origins of Trademark Protection

Trademarks date back as far as 2000 B.c. and were prevalent
in early Rome and throughout the Middle Ages. 13 Trademarks in
reach until tomorrow-and is there engaged in doing something which will
enable him to advantage himself at someone else's expense in some manner
hitherto unthought of.
Edward S. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act, 38
TRADEMARK REP. 259, 270 (1948), reprinted in 54 TRADEMARK REP. 752, 767 (1964).
10. See infra Part I.e.
11. See infra Part I.B.3.
12. See infra Part I.e.
13. Although there is no precise date when the first trademark was used, the
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the form of cattle brands and other crude geometric shapes were
originally used as a method of identifying the owner of a particular
piece of chattel. l4 As early economies evolved into trade-based
economies, trademarks evolved into a means of identifying the pro
ducer of a particular good. 15
The economy of the American colonial era was nearly entirely
based upon local and regional trade. 16 Federal regulation of trade
marks was nonexistent because there was no national market in
which to sell goods.J7 Therefore, regulation of marks used to iden
tify goods was a matter handled on the locallevel.1 8 A person wish
ing to use a specific mark would petition the local court, and the
practice presumably dates back to antiquity. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R.
THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADE
MARKS 541-43 (2003); Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks,
65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 268-69, 271 (1975), reprinted in 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222
(1983). Some of the earliest evidence of the use of trademarks hre drawings originating
from around 2000 B.C. that have been found on cave walls and depict the branding of
cattle. Devils Rope Museum, http://www.barbwiremuseum.com/cattlebrandhistory.htm
(last visited Dec. 30,2006). The Bible also makes reference to branding, signifying that
the practice was commonplace and well-known to the author of the verse. Genesis 4:15.
However, until archeologists perform the necessary research and scientific dating, legal
scholars will continue to differ on a precise date of the first use of trademarks. See
Diamond, supra, at 265 ("Some day a cultural anthropologist may concentrate on this
aspect of ancient life and develop a theory to help us understand how and why trade
marks began.").
14. See Devils Rope Museum, supra note 13 (providing a history of cattle brand
ing). The marks found in ancient civilizations served a different function than the
marks of today. Ancient marks were most likely used to signify ownership within a
family unit, as these ancient civilizations were centered on family units and had very
primitive, almost nonexistent, trade-based economies. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra
note 13, at 541-43. Such proprietary marks can still be found today. "For example,
horses and cattle are [still] branded with proprietary marks, and many bottles used for
the distribution of milk ... have the distributor's mark blown into them." LoUIs ALT
MAN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 17.2
(May 2003) (noting that such marks on products can also be used to trace the goods
back to the producer in the event of a defective product).
15. Early Rome was an early civilization that utilized trademarks for economic
purposes. Diamond, supra note 13, at 270. Perhaps the most famous Roman mark was
the FORTIS mark found on oil lamps. Id. at 271. The mark has been found in Italy,
France, Germany, Holland, England, and Spain, leading scholars to believe that the
widespread distribution was due to copying and counterfeiting which could have been
the first instance of trademark infringement. [d. at 269.
16. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 543.
17. See id.
18. Id. Trademarks did not historically garner much judicial attention. Id. It
took until 1837 for the first post-American-independence trademark decision to be re
ported. [d. It took until 1845 for the first state trademark statute to be adopted by New
York. Id. at 543 n.6. Great Britain adopted its first statute on trademarks in 1862.
H.R. REP. No. 58-3147, at 3 (1904).
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court would either grant or deny use of the mark. 19 It was not until
after the Civil War that trademark law became a matter of national
concern.20
By the late nineteenth century, large-scale production capabili
ties allowed producers to nationally distribute products to a grow
ing consumer economy.21 Along with national distribution came
the first national advertising campaigns that, in turn, gave birth to
the first nationally recognized brands.22 Up until 1870, trademark
law was entirely state created, meaning no federal trademark pro
tection was available for these national brands. 23 A seller was
forced to comply with multiple state regulations that acted as barri
ers to his selling products in multiple states. 24 As a response to the
diverse regulations among the states, the first congressional trade
mark Act was passed in 1870 to unify the protections afforded to
consumers and businesses under a single, federallaw. 25
1.

The 1870 Act

The 1870 Act relied on the Copyright and Patent Clause for
power to establish a national means for the registration of trade
19. Beverly W. Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68
TRADEMARK REP. 121, 121-22 (1978). A pre-presidential George Washington peti
tioned at the local courthouse for a trademark in his G. WASHINGTON flour. [d. at
121.
20. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 544.
21. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, /900-2000,88 CAL. L. REV. 2187,2206-07 (2000); see also Swann, supra note 2, at
586 (recognizing gains in productivity due to the electric motor and railroads).
22. Merges, supra note 21, at 2207-08 (recognizing trademarks such as QUAKER
OATS, CAMPBELL SOUP, HEINZ, LIBBY vegetables, PROCTOR & GAMBLE,
COLGATE, SWIFT meats, PABST, SCHLITZ, and ANHEUSER BREWING). Swift
forward integrated its slaughterhouse business by using refrigerated railcars to ship fro
zen meats from the Midwest to the East Coast. Id. at 2207 n.90 (citing PETER GEORGE,
THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 83 (1982».
23. Merges, supra note 21, at 2208-09; see also Diggins, supra note 7, at 201 (not
ing that most states have had trademark registration laws).
24. See Merges, supra note 21, at 2208. The state regulations "would provide
work for lawyers and state registration specialists but would be detrimental to trade
mark owners and to the public." Diggins, supra note 7, at 201 (quoting Bulletin Regard
ing Circulars Recently Issued by Certain Self-Styled "Trade Mark Specialists", reprinted
in 17 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 740, 741 (1935».
25. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,861 n.2 (1982) (White,
J., concurring) ("[T]he purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common
law of unfair competition and trademark protection.") (citing S. REP. No. 79-1333
(1946»; Merges, supra note 21, at 2208-10. In 1870, there were only one hundred and
twenty-one registered trademarks; in 1923, this number had ballooned to fifteen thou
sand. FRANK 1. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADE-MARK LAW 134 (photo. reprint 1999) (1925).
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marks.26 Nine years after the law's inception, the United States Su
preme Court held the 1870 Act unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark
Cases.27 The Court held Congress could not regulate trademarks
through the Copyright and Patent Clause, as trademarks were a
separate and distinct form of intellectual property not included in
the language of the Copyright and Patent Clause. 28 The 1870 Act
also usurped the states' control over purely intrastate commerce
matters and, therefore, the Act amounted to an unconstitutional ex
ercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 29 How
ever, the Court did not foreclose the idea of a constitutional Act for
the regulation of trademarks based on the Commerce Clause.

2.

The 1881 Act

With the Supreme Court's decision in the Trade-Mark Cases as
a backdrop, on March 3,1881, Congress enacted the Act to Author
ize the Registration of Trade-Marks, and Protect the Same. 3D The
scope of the 1881 Act was very narrow, allowing only the registra
tion of marks used in trade with foreign nations or Indian tribes. 31
Therefore, this statute offered no domestic federal trademark pro
tection. 32 The limited scope of the 1881 Act ultimately proved inef
26. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, §§ 77-84; see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8; Merges, supra note 21, at 2208-09 ("To promote the Progress of Science and

useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
27. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
28. Id. at 93-94.
29. Id. at 97.
30. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. After the 1870 Act was declared
unconstitutional, "Congress was flooded with proposed new legislation on the subject,
even including a resolution for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
granting to Congress express power to regulate the use of trade-marks." H.R. REP. No.
58-3147, at 2 (1904).
31. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502; see also H.R. REP. No. 58-3147, at
2 (noting that Congress based the law on its treaty power as opposed to its commerce
power).
32. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 545. Thomas Jefferson recognized
the need for separate state and federal trademark protections early on. Edward S. Rog
ers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 239, 251-52
(1972) (originally appeared in 9 MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910». In petitioning the court for a
sail maker to be permitted to register a mark in 1791, he argued, "[t]hat these cases are
of divided jurisdiction: Manufactures made and consumed within a State being subject
to State legislation, while those which are exported to foreign nations, or to another
State, or into the Indian Territory are alone within the legislation of the General Gov
ernment." Id. at 252. One can only wonder how our Founding Fathers saw the Com
merce Clause as a means of federal power over trademark regulations, while it took
Congress almost 100 years to actually use that clause as a source of legislative power
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fective at federally regulating trademarks. 33
3.

The 1905 Act

The 1905 Trademark Act built upon the foundation laid in the
1881 Act by extending protection to include marks used in inter
state commerce. 34 Although the 1905 Act added new sections while
expanding the scope and applicability of earlier enacted sections,35
the 1905 Act was still limited in its scope. 36 Congress attempted to
rectify these limitations by amending or supplementing the 1905
Act a total of sixteen times. 37 Ultimately, the Lanham Trade-Mark
Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) replaced the 1905 Trademark Act. 38
B.

The Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946

Before the Lanham Act,39 trademark law "threatened to result
in 'an intolerable mess, because [there were] 48 separate sovereign
ties to deal with, each legislating as it [saw] fit with respect to marks
within its borders regardless of where those marks originate[d]."'40
State legislatures aggressively promoted compulsory registration
statutes as "an opportunity to make the outsider pay revenue,"
rather than as a means of providing adequate trademark protec
over trademarks. See Diggins, supra note 7, at 202-03 (noting that Congress had "a
feeling of uncertainty as to its powers").
33. See Pattishall, supra note 19, at 133-34 (noting that the 1881 Act did not pro
vide substantive trademark rights, but merely granted access to the federal courts and
provided prima facie evidence of ownership).
34. Merges, supra note 21, at 2209; see also H.R. REP. No. 58-3147, at 6-10 (dis
cussing the provisions of the 1905 Act). Compare Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138,21 Stat.
502, with Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724.
35. See generally H.R. REP. No. 58-3147, at 6-10 (discussing the provisions of the
1905 Act).
36. See Diggins, supra note 7, at 202 (finding the Act to fall short of its
objectives).
37. See Pattishall, supra note 19, at 136 (citing Act of June 10, 1938, ch. 332, §§ 1
3,5,52 Stat. 638, 639; Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 617, 49 Stat. 1539; Act of June 25,1936,
ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921; Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 426,48 Stat. 926; Act of April 11, 1930, ch.
132, § 4, 46 Stat. 155; Act of March 2,1929, ch. 488, § 2(b), 45 Stat. 1476; Act of March
4, 1925, ch. 535, §§ 1, 3, 43 Stat. 1268; Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 341, 43 Stat. 647; Act of
March 19, 1920, ch. 104, §§ 1-9,41 Stat. 533; Act of January 8,1913, ch. 7,37 Stat. 649;
Act of August 24, 1912, ch. 370, § 5,37 Stat. 498; Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 291,36
Stat. 1167; Act of February 18, 1911, ch. 113,36 Stat. 918; Act of February 18, 1909, ch.
144,35 Stat. 627,628; Act of March 2,1907, ch. 2573, §§ 1,2,34 Stat. 1251, 1252; Act of
May 4, 1906, ch. 2081, §§ 1-3, 34 Stat. 168, 169).
38. Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946) (repealing previous Acts).
39. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
40. Diggins, supra note 7, at 202-03 (quoting Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade
Marks of the H. Comm. on Patents on H. R. 9041, 75th Congo 11-13 (1938) (statement of
Edward S. Rogers)).
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tion.41 While many trademark infringement suits wound up in fed
eral court, the absence of a federal common law forced federal
courts to apply the law of the state in which they sat.42 Trademark
protection, therefore, varied depending upon the state in which a
claim was brought.
Congressman Fritz Lanham, Chairman of the Patent Commit
tee in the U.S. House of Representatives, recognized the problems
with state-based registrations and was persistent in his push for a
trademark revision. 43 However, opponents of Congressman Lan
ham's proposed revisions argued that increasing trademark protec
tion would hurt competition by granting the holder of the rights to
the mark a monopoly in the mark itself.44 Consequently, the Act
would promote monopolistic competition-a chief evil of unfair
competition laws. 45 The Justice Department was among the oppo
nents of the Act because any expansion of the scope of then-ex
isting trademark laws could effectively nullify fair competition
among businesses. 46 Congressman Lanham would not heed the
41. Id. at 202-03, 203 n.27 (quoting Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of
the H. Comm. on Patents on H. R. 9041, 75th Congo 11-13 (1938) (statement of Edward
S. Rogers».
42. Id. at 201-03 & n.27 (noting that the Erie doctrine required federal courts to
apply the laws of the state where they sat).
43. See Pattishall, supra note 19, at 136-37 (1978).
44. Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks,
62 TRADEMARK REP. 255, 259-60 (1972); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Mo
nopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 485 (1999) (concluding that extending trademark protec
tion "directly threatens competition").
45. Rogers, supra note 44, at 259-60; see also Lunney, supra note 44, at 485 (con
cluding that extending protection today "directly threatens competition"). Although a
single-firm market by itself would have monopolistic control over price, it has been
argued that a single-firm market will act as though the market is perfectly competitive if
there is a threat of instantaneous entry by a second firm. Frank J. Easterbrook, Infor
mation and Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 1,2 (2000) (citing WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET
AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1988».
46. Rogers, supra note 44, at 259-60. It should be noted that the term "monop
oly" carries with it a severely negative connotation. However, a healthy economy is a
mixture of "competitive and monopolistic elements." Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171
(1948) (citing Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV.
241 (1940». Trademarks are actually anti-monopolistic because they signify the pres
ence of competing products. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 50. If the market was
monopolized by one producer, there would be no reason to promote the trademark
because there would only be one product to choose from. Id. Trademarks therefore
give the owner exclusive rights to that mark, not to the market. Id. But see EDWARD
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56-70, 204 (1938) (argu
ing that trademarks give control of entire markets to a single producer in much the
same manner as a monopoly). Indeed, scholars have suggested that trademarks are so
vitally important to economic well-being that they can be used to effectively gauge the
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critics, and so, over an eight-year period, numerous bills were intro
duced to five different Congresses. 47 Finally, President Harry S.
Truman signed the Lanham Act into law on July 5, 1947. 48
The Lanham Act radically changed the face of trademark pro
tection and "did indeed put federal trade-mark law upon a new
footing. "49 While the intricacies of the Act are outside the scope of
this Note, a basic understanding of what the Act protects, as well as
the Act's jurisdictional language and the Supreme Court's interpre
tation of that language is necessary to understand how the First Cir
cuit's decision in McBee v. Delica Co. 50 protects trademarks in a
global economy.
1.

What is a Trademark?

Put simply, "trademarks ... make possible a choice between
competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from
the other."51 They distinguish similar and competing products by
economic conditions of a region. See Jay D. Gatrell & S.L. Brian Ceh, Trademark Data
as Economic Indicator: The United States 1996-2000, 10 GREAT LAKES GEOGRAPHER
46 (2003), available at http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/geog/research/greaUakes~eographer/
GLG_volumel0/Gatrell %20and %20Ceh.pdf.
47. Pattishall, supra note 19, at 136-37; SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at
545. The numerous bills that were introduced took the following path to become a law:
Hearings on the bill and the various forms in which it was re-introduced were
held in March 1938, March 1939, June 1939, and passed the House and Senate
in 1939 and 1940. However, the Senate moved to reconsider the bill on June
23, 1940 and it was returned to the calendar and died. In the 77th Congress a
re-introduced bill passed the Senate in 1941 and the House in 1942, but the bill
died upon being referred back to Committee in 1942. Hearings were held in
the 78th Congress in 1943 and 1944, but the bill was not passed. Finally, the
1945 version of the bill (H.R. 1654) was passed by the 79th Congress. For
details of legislative history, see S. Res. No. 1333, 79th Congo 2d Sess. (1946),
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1277-1278.
Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 839 n.51 (2000) (quoting 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:4,
at 5-11 n.6 (4th ed. 2000».
48. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 545.
49. S.c. Johnson & Son, Inc. V. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1949); see also
Pattishall, supra note 19, at 139-41. One result of the Lanham Act was to eliminate the
effect of the Erie doctrine in trademark cases in federal courts. Diggins, supra note 7,
at 213.
50. McBee V. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005). The McBee decision forms
the basis of this Note and is explained in detail in Part I.C.3. McBee adopts a substan
tial effects test to determine when extraterritorial jurisdictional exists. Id. at 121.
51. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275. In the
words of Edward S. Rogers, "[y]ou can't have competition unless you can distinguish
the competing goods and choose between them. Trade-marks make this distinction and
this choice possible." Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of

2006]

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE LANHAM ACT

203

providing the consumer with a visual stimulus that triggers the con
sumer's memory.52 The visual stimulus is often the basis by which a
consumer is able to recall his past experience with the product,
which in turn prompts him to make a current selection. 53 In 1942,
Justice Frankfurter described a trademark as a merchandising
short-cut whose goal was "to convey through the mark, in the minds
of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has
something of value."54 Whether the product is an American-made
COKE or a Japanese-made TOYOTA, the trademark's vital role in
a country's economy has led to some form of registration procedure
in over 200 countries. 55
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name,
symbol, or device or any combination thereof used by a person ...
to identify and distinguish his or her goods from those manufac
Trade-marks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 180 (1949). Professor Rogers published
numerous articles on trademark law and was a primary draftsman of the Lanham Act as
chair of an ABA committee in 1946. See generally Greg R. Vetter, Introduction, 41
Hous. L. REV. 707 (2004) (citing a 1949 article written by Professor Rogers for a sym
posium entitled: "Trade-Marks in Transition").
52. See Drescher, supra note 1, at 322-23 (comparing a consumer's perception of
QUAKER OATS versus oats in a bin). According to Judge Posner:
A trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself,
"I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase
because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are
the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier."
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTEL
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW].
53. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law,
78 TRADEMARK REP. 267,271 (1988) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, The Economics of
Trademark Law]. Trademarks are, therefore, a tool used to increase the efficiency of
decision making. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 547 (citing William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 275 (1987)). However, a consumer will only use trademarks as a decision
making tool if doing so is cheaper than searching for the desired attributes of the prod
uct, and past experiences likely indicate future experiences. Landes & Posner, The Ec
onomics of Trademark Law, supra, at 271 (finding that there must be continuity in
brand quality).
54. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION ch. 3, § 9 (1995) (de
fining trademark as "a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a combina
tion of such designations, that is distinctive of a person's goods or services and that is
used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and distinguishes them from the
goods or services of others").
55. E. Brooke Brinkerhoff, Comment, International Protection of u.s. Trade
marks: A Survey of Major International Treaties, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 109, 110
(2001) (citing STEVEN HOFFER, WORLD CYBERSPACE LAW § 7.5.3 (1999)).
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tured or sold by others."56 This easy-to-understand definition de
scribes what "thing" is being protected by the law. However, the
"thing's" role in commerce goes beyond such a simplistic definition
and warrants far-reaching protection.
2.

Jurisdictional Language of the Lanham Act

Before a court can reach the merits of any infringement claim,
there must be a basis for the court to assert jurisdiction over the
matter. Typically, plaintiffs prefer to litigate in the United States
where trademark laws are more protective than the laws of other
countries. 57 In addition, U.S. courts are more appealing because of
favorable procedural rules and standards. 58 As such, plaintiffs will
often seek to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Lan
ham Act, rather than bring a matter in a foreign judicial system.
The Lanham Act's broad jurisdictional grant rests in its stated
intent "to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in
such commerce."59 The Act defines "commerce" as "all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress"60 and holds liable
"any person who shall ... in commerce" infringe on the mark of
another. 61 Although there is nothing in the Constitution preventing
Congress from passing laws that reach beyond the U.S. border,
there exists a presumption that U.S. laws are meant to only have
territorial application. 62 Thus, the question of whether the Lanham
56. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
57. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Global
ism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 506 (1997). As evidence of this, the U.S. government has
been attempting to force foreign countries to expand or better enforce their existing
intellectual property laws. Id.
58. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 4 (1996) (noting that U.S. courts permit contingent fee agreements, have broad
discovery practices, do not usually hold litigants responsible for the adversary's attor
ney's fees, and tend to award larger damages when compared to other countries). As
one English court remarked: "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to
the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a
fortune." Id. at 4 (quoting Smith Kline & French Labs. v. Bloch, 2 All E.R. 72, 74
(1983)).
59. 15 U.S.c. § 1127.
60. Id.
61. 15 U.S.c. § 1114(1) (2000). Infringement is use of a mark in commerce with
out the consent of the registrant. Id.
62. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritori
ality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998). Justice Holmes found it "surprising to hear it
argued that [acts done outside the United States] were governed by the act of Con
gress," and found such a notion to be a "startling proposition." Am. Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909). Since Congress "is primarily concerned with
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Act could be applied extraterritorially was a matter of statutory in
tent that was largely unresolved until the 1952 decision in SteeLe v.
BuLova Watch Co. 63
3.

SteeLe v. BuLova Watch Co.

SteeLe was the first, and only, Supreme Court decision inter
preting the jurisdictional language of the Lanham Act for purposes
of extraterritorial application. 64 In Steele, the defendant was a U.S ..
citizen operating a watch business in Mexico, where he applied for a
Mexican trademark for BULOVA.65 The plaintiff watch manufac
turer had already properly registered the BULOVA mark for use
on its watches in the United States. 66 The defendant imported
watch components to Mexico from Switzerland and the United
States, and stamped BULOVA on the assembled watches. 67 Al
though the defendant did not sell his counterfeit BULOVA watches
in the United States, they were often purchased by American citi
zens in Mexico and brought back to the United States. 68
The plaintiff filed suit when he was alerted to the defendant's
infringing acts by upset consumers whose watches had broken. 69
The defendant asserted that the Court lacked subject-matter juris
diction over the case because the Lanham Act could not extend to
acts of infringement that occur in Mexico.7° Therefore, the ques
tion before the Court was whether Congress intended the Lanham
Act to be applied to the facts in this case. 71
The Court acknowledged this was a case of statutory interpre
tation, as the laws of the United States do not extend beyond the
territorial boundaries of the country unless Congress clearly intends
domestic conditions," any legisl~tion Congress enacts should be confined to the territo
rial United States. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). This view is
commonly referred to as a "strict presumption" against extraterritoriality. Jonathan
Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extra
territoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 607 (1990) (finding that Foley entrenched the pre
sumption against extraterritoriality as a canon of statutory construction).
63. See Dodge, supra note 62; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
64. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 831-32.
65. Steele, 344 U.S. at 281, 285.
66. Id. at 281.
67. Id. at 285.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. [d. at 282.
71. [d. at 285 (finding the issue to be "whether Congress intended to make the
law applicable" extraterritorially (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949»).
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otherwise.12 Since the Lanham Act's plain language reaches "all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,"73 the
Court found that the Act shows Congressional intent to confer a
"broad jurisdictional grant" to the federal courtS.74 The Court
thereby held the Lanham Act could be applied extraterritorially.
C.

Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act after Steele

In Steele, the Supreme Court acknowledged congressional in
tent for the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act when
both parties to the action are American citizens.75 However, since
the infringer in Steele was a citizen of the United States, the Court
did not address whether the Lanham Act could be applied when the
infringer is not a U.S. citizen and the infringement occurs outside
the United States. Consequently, the ability of the Lanham Act to
protect domestic registrants against infringements by foreign in
fringers is not entirely clear from the text of the Lanham Act or
from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act in Steele.7 6
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have subsequently interpreted
Steele as granting subject-matter jurisdiction contingent upon three
factors.7 7 First, the defendant's conduct must have an effect on do
mestic commerce.78 Second, the defendant must be a citizen of the
United States.79 Finally, there must be no conflict with the trade
mark rights conferred by foreign law. 80 These factors provide a
framework for analyzing specific factual circumstances, but "[do]
not define the outer limits of Congressional power. "81
The three factors do not amount to a bright-line test for deter
mining when to apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially. Thus,
courts have differed on the proper weight and interpretation to give
each factor when confronted with variations from the facts of
Steele. 82 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir
72. Id.
73. [d. at 284 (quoting Lanham Act, 15 v.s.c. § 1114 (2000».
74. [d. at 286 (quoting Lanham Act, 15 v.s.c. § 1114).
75. Id. at 284-86; see also 15 V.S.c. § 1114(1).
76. See 15 V.S.c. § 1127; Steele, 344 V.S. at 283-87 (acknowledging that the Lan
ham Act reaches "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress").
77. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956);
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977).
78. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642; Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428.
79. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642; Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428.
80. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642; Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428.
81. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 118 (1st Cir. 2005).
82. See id. at 121 (using "the substantial effects test as the sole touchstone to
determine jurisdiction"); Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428 (finding "each factor is just one
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cuit was the first court of appeals to interpret Steele, which it did in
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton CO.83 In that case, it adopted
what is now known as the Vanity Fair test. 84 The Vanity Fair test
has formed the basis for other circuits' analyses of extraterritorial
Lanham Act jurisdiction.85 Interestingly, district courts within the
Second Circuit have relaxed the Vanity Fair criteria so as to permit
a wider extraterritorial application. 86
The Ninth Circuit chose to diverge from the Vanity Fair test
and to analogize trademark law with antitrust law. 87 The court
adopted an interpretation of Steele involving a balancing test of sev
eral comity factors similar to its prior antitrust jurisprudence. 88 The
Fifth Circuit uses a similar approach, but notes that the Vanity Fair
factors will be the "primary elements in any balancing analysis."89
Contrary to the multi-prong tests of the Second and Ninth Cir
cuits, the First Circuit has adopted a "substantial effects" test as the
sole jurisdictional factor. 9o In doing so, the First Circuit expressly
rejected the other circuits' approaches to determining when extra
territorial jurisdiction is proper. 91 To understand why the single
prong approach adopted by the First Circuit best protects consum
ers and businesses, it is necessary to first analyze the Second Cir
cuit's Vanity Fair test and the Ninth Circuit's balancing test.
1.

Second Circuit: The Vanity Fair Test

Shortly after Steele was decided, the Second Circuit had an op
consideration to be balanced"); Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 643 (finding "the absence of
one of the above factors might well be determinative and ... the absence of both is
certainly fatal").
83. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., InCl Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe InCl (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d
1274,1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff's complaint failed to alleged two of
the three Steele factors); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 252 (4th
Cir. 1994) (remanding for reconsideration in light of all three Steele factors).
86. See, e.g., Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(finding harm to reputation can cause a substantial effect); Calvin Klein Indus. v. BFK
Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (relaxing the substantial effects
requirement).
87. See Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428-29 (following its analysis in Timberlane Lum
ber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976».
88. See id.
89. See Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop., 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir.
1983) (noting that the Vanity Fair factors will be the "primary elements in any balancing
analysis").
90. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 118-21 (1st CiT. 2005).
91. /d. at 121.
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portunity to interpret the Supreme Court's decision.92 In Vanity
Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., the plaintiff sued for trademark
infringement stemming from the defendant's unauthorized use of
the VANITY FAIR name. 93 The plaintiff was a Pennsylvania cor
poration that had sold women's undergarments under the name
VANITY FAIR in the United States since 1914 and in Canada since
1917. 94 The defendant was a Canadian corporation doing business
throughout Canada, and which, in 1915, was granted Canadian re
gistration of VANITY FAIR for use in connection with "wearing
apparel. "95
In 1919, the plaintiff attempted to register the trademark VAN
ITY FAIR in Canada for its undergarments, but was rejected be
cause of the prior registration by the defendant. 96 The defendant
modified its registration in 1933 to specifically include" 'women's
underwear, corsets, girdles and other foundation garments."'97 In
1953, the defendant began selling the plaintiff's branded merchan
dise while simultaneously selling its own Canadian-manufactured
undergarments under the same VANITY FAIR mark. 98 The plain
tiff's complaint sought an injunction against the defendant's use of
the VANITY FAIR trademark in association with the sale of under
garments in the United States and Canada. 99
The Second Circuit developed a three-prong test based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Steele. lOo For a court to assert extra
territorial jurisdiction, (1) the conduct of the defendant must have a
"substantial"l01 effect on U.S. commerce; (2) the defendant must be
a U.S. citizen; and (3) there can be no conflict with foreign law. 102
Failing to satisfy one of the factors "might well be determinative,"
and "the absence of [two] is certainly fatal. "103
92.

Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
/d. at 637.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 638.
97. Id. (quoting defendant's modification to registration).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 642-43.
101. The Second Circuit added the requirement that the effects be "substantial."
See Anna R. Popov, Note, Watering Down Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. to Reach E
Commerce Overseas: Analyzing the Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Under Interna
tional Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 705, 710-11 (2004) (noting that the requirement of a
"substantial" effect on commerce is not present in Steele).
102. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642-43.
103. Id. at 643.
93.
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After developing its three-prong test, the Second Circuit found
that extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act was improper in
this case because only one part of the test was satisfied.104 While
there were substantial effects on U.S. commerce, the other two
prongs of the test could not be satisfied. lOS Although the defendant
employed American citizens in its New York office, the employees
did not exert enough control over the company to consider it a U.S.
citizen.1 06 In addition, there was a valid Canadian trademark creat
ing an unavoidable conflict between U.S. and foreign law.1 07 Thus,
two prongs of the test failed and extraterritorial application of the
Lanham Act was not proper. 1 0S
Although the prongs of the Vanity Fair test appear to be une
quivocal, courts have not applied them in a strict fashion. In the
years following the establishment of the Vanity Fair test, district
courts have continually relaxed the components of the three
pronged test. 109 Two specific cases are especially relevant.

a.

Calvin Klein Industries, Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd. 11o

In Calvin Klein Industries, Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., the
district court relaxed the substantial-effects requirement from Van
ity Fair to include a foreign citizen who resided in New York and
ran a New York corporation whose actions were causing a diversion
of the plaintiff's sales overseas. 11l The defendant used the CAL
VIN KLEIN trademark on jeans sold outside the United States. 112
The court found the defendant had "constructive citizenship" due
to his ties to the United States and therefore found it proper to
treat him as though he were a U.S. citizen.1 13 The court also deter
mined that the substantial-effects requirement was satisfied, as long
as the infringing activity was "supported by or related to conduct in
Id.
Id. at 642.
106. Id. at 643. In fact, the court found it "abundantly clear" that the American
employees did not direct the affairs of the company. Id. Such direction was provided
by Canadian citizens. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Popov, supra note 101, at 711.
110. Calvin Klein Indus. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
111. Id. at 80.
112. Id.
113. Id. As the phrase "constructive citizenship" suggests, the individual defen
dant was not actually a citizen of the United States. However, the court found his ties
to the U.S. sufficient to make it equitable to subject him to U.S. jurisdiction. Id.
104.
105.
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United States commerce."1l4 The diversion of sales from a foreign
licensee was sufficient to have a substantial effect on commerce.1 15
b.

Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp.1 16

In Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., a district court further expanded
the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act by finding that a
wholly owned Spanish subsidiary of a U.S. corporation could satisfy
the citizenship requirement, while harm to the plaintiff's reputation
was sufficient to satisfy the substantial-effects prong of the Vanity
Fair test.1 17 In Warnaco, the parties were competitors, and the de
fendant sold the plaintiff's WARNER merchandise in a disparaging
manner, which weakened the WARNER trademark in Europe. l1S
The court found that sales were diverted from the plaintiff by the
negative impact on the plaintiff's income, reputation, and licen
sees.1 19 This led to a direct effect in the United States on the com
petitive positions of the two firms.12o Warnaco expanded the Vanity
Fair test by granting jurisdiction even though the harm was not
caused by a U.S. citizen, but rather, was caused by a Spanish subsid
iary corporation. 121 In addition, the harm to income, reputation,
and licensees was confined to Europe because the consumers who
might have been confused were Europeans, not Americans. 122
2.

Ninth Circuit: Balancing Test

In 1977, more than twenty years after the Second Circuit estab
114. [d.
115. [d.
116. Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
117. Id. at 952.
118. [d. at 944-45. In particular, Wamaco alleged in its complaint:
[T]hat the Defendants failed to continue their historical practice of introduc
ing new WARNER's styles into the marketplace, thereby creating a false im
pression that the WARNER's brand was leaving the marketplace; that they
failed to print a 1993 catalogue promoting WARNER's brand products and
instead merely reprinted the 1992 catalogue; that they intentionally ceased to
manufacture and maintain an inventory of basic carryover styles; that they
took extraordinary steps to sell off WARNER's inventory and willfully dis
rupted the marketplace and the orderly transition of the business of selling
WARNER's Licensed Products.
Id. at 944.
119. [d. at 950-52.
120. [d. at 952.
121. [d. The court sidesteps the subsidiary issue by finding that the defendant
will have to litigate in New York because of a forum selection clause in the parties'
contract. Id. Any burden of New York litigation would therefore be lessened. Id.
122. Popov, supra note 101, at 713.
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lished the Vanity Fair test, the Ninth Circuit adopted a "jurisdic
tional rule of reason" to govern the extraterritorial application of
the Lanham Act. 123 In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express
Co., the plaintiff engaged in numerous business endeavors using its
properly registered trademark WELLS FARGO.l24 The defendant
was a Liechtenstein corporation which was using the WELLS
FARGO trademark in the United States and Europe. 125 After the
district court used the Second Circuit's Vanity Fair test as the basis
for rejecting subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and adopted a
balancing test based on the "jurisdictional rule of reason,"126 which
the Ninth Circuit had established in the antitrust case Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America. 127 The balancing test requires (1)
an effect on U.S. commence,128 and (2) an analysis of several com
ity factors.129 The comity analysis the Ninth Circuit adopted from
its Timberlane decision requires the court to weigh
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality
or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principle places
of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.13o

The balancing features of the Wells Fargo test are in stark con
123. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 427-28 (9th Cir.
1977).
124. Id. at 411.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 427-28; see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976).
127. Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d 597.
128. Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428. The court did not interpret Steele as requiring a
substantial effect on commerce. Id. The court reasoned that the substantial effects
requirement is a tool to preserve federalism and state autonomy and is, therefore, the
way to distinguish intrastate commerce from interstate commerce. Id. (citing
Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 612). While the substantial effects requirement limits
the ability of Congress to regulate intrastate commerce, such a limitation is not needed
with foreign commerce because the Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority
over it. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 428-29 (citing Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 614-15).
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trast to Vanity Fair's bright-line tripartite test. Vanity Fair only re
quires an analysis of three factors, while Wells Fargo permits the
court to take into account and afford different weights to a number
of factual criteria. 131 This fundamental difference between the ap
proaches has allowed courts to give the Wells Fargo test a wider
range of interpretations, because they are permitted to give varying
weight to different factors,132 The wide range of interpretations
gives courts the ability to manipulate facts in order to see justice
done. 133 As a result, district courts have not been forced to modify
the Wells Fargo test to reach just results.
3.

First Circuit: Substantial Effects Test

The latest circuit to weigh in on the issue of extraterritorial
application of the Lanham Act is the First Circuit in its decision in
McBee v. Delica CO.134 Cecil McBee (McBee) was a well-known
American jazz musician, whose forty-five year music career in
cluded world-wide performances of over 200 albums, including six
albums recorded under his own name.135 He toured Japan several
times throughout his career and, at the time of litigation, continued
to do SO.136 Due to his desire to "have [his] name associated only
with musical excellence," McBee limited the licensing of his name
to items with a direct connection to his music.13 7
In 1984, the defendant, Delica Company (Delica), adopted the
name CECIL MCBEE for its young women's clothing line in Japan
and obtained a Japanese trademark for the CECIL MCBEE
name.138 Delica owned and operated Japanese retail stores, but did
not sell its clothing line outside of Japan, nor have retail shops
outside of Japan.139 In 2002, the company sold about $112 million
worth of CECIL MCBEE products,14o
Delica used two forms of media to advertise its products. First,
the company produced a "style book," which contained pictures of
131. Compare Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir.
1956), with Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428.
132. See Popov, supra note 101, at 717 (citing numerous Ninth Circuit decisions).
133. Id.
134. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Lewis R. Clayton,
Extraterritorial Reach, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 2005, at 13 (analyzing the McBee decision).
135. McBee, 417 F.3d at 112.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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its latest clothing designs, and was embedded almost exclusively
with Japanese text. 141 While the style book allowed a customer to
order by telephone or fax, a third-party company handled any or
ders placed in this manner. 142 Delica also used a website that was
created and hosted in Japan, but was viewable from any Internet
connected device. I43 The website's content was similar to that con
tained in the printed "style book," but also contained locations and
telephone numbers of CECIL MCBEE retail stores. 144 Consumers
could not order products directly from the website.1 45
After learning of Delica's use of his name in 1995, McBee un
successfully attempted to have the company's Japanese trademark
invalidated by the Japanese Patent Office. 146 In 2002, McBee filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Maine, asserting trademark dilution and unfair competition under
the Lanham Act.147 In dismissing the complaint, the district court
applied the Vanity Fair test and found that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over all of the plaintiff's Lanham Act claims.148
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re
jected the district court's application of the Vanity Fair test.149 The
Court instead found that the "sole touchstone to determine jurisdic
tion" over foreign defendants is whether the defendant's acts have a
substantial effect upon U.S. commerce. I50 The proper analysis of
extraterritorial-application questions is to "first ask whether the de
fendant is an American citizen, and if he is not, then [to] use the
substantial effects test as the sole touchstone to determine jurisdic
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Cecil McBee Web Magazine, http://www.cecilmcbee.net (last
visited Dec. 30, 2006).
144. McBee, 417 F.3d at 112.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 113.
147. Id. at 115.
148. Id. at 116; see also McBee v. Delica Co., No. 02-198-P-C, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23415 (D. Me. Aug. 19, 2004) (applying the Vanity Fair test to determine the
Lanham Act does not grant subject-matter jurisdiction). The district court found that
the defendant was obviously not an American citizen and the "relief sought would be in
conflict with the defendant's trademark rights under Japanese law, as it currently
stands." Id. at *9-11. Therefore, dismissal was proper without even determining
whether the effects on commerce were substantial. Id. at *11 ("[F]ailure to satisfy two
of the three is sufficient to deprive the United States courts of subject-matter
jurisdiction. ").
149. McBee, 417 F.3d at 121.
150. Id. at 118-21.
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tion."151 The substantial effects test requires compelling evidence
that is sufficient to "give the United States a reasonably strong in
terest in the litigation."152 The substantial effects test must also be
applied in line with the underlying core purposes of the Lanham
Act, namely to prevent the confusion of U.S. consumers and to pro
tect the trademark owner's financial interest in the mark.153 Even if
there is a substantial effect on U.S. commerce that permits jurisdic
tion, the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction based on a
separate comity analysis. 154
II.

ANALYSIS-TRADEMARKS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY

Ever-present changes in economic conditions are the driving
force behind the evolution of trademark law. 155 National trade
mark protection was essential to the merger of the state and re
gional economies of the early 1900s into a unified, national
economy.156 While the Lanham Act was the result of a major wave
of change in the American business landscape, the Act remains true
to the core purposes of trademark law. 157 Specifically, the Lanham
151. Id. at 121.
152. Id. at 120.
153. Id. at 121.
154. Id. The court here did not refuse to adopt the Wells Fargo framework for
the comity analysis; rather, the court chose to look at comity after asserting jurisdiction.
Id.
155. Swann, supra note 2, at 587 (noting that cultural and economic changes had
outpaced trademark law at the turn of the twentieth century); Robert W. Sacoff, Trade
mark Law in the Technology-Driven Global Marketplace, 4 YALE SYMPOSIUM ON L. &
TECH. 8 (2001) (discussing how European Union member countries have harmonized
their trademark laws to keep pace with technology-driven global commerce).
156. Swann, supra note 2, at 586. The state and regional economies could even
be characterized as local economies, as they were principally agrarian. Because the
guarantor of purchased products was typically located close to the product itself, the
need for identification marks was minimal. See id. For example, in many communities
"the country store owner, not Nabisco (or then 'Uneeda'), stood behind the crackers in
the barrel." Id. (citing JULIANN SIVULKA, SOAP, SEX, AND CIGARElTES: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ADVERTISING 20 (1998».
157. Wallace In!'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 78
(2d Cir. 1990) (finding the core purpose of trademark law is to prevent copying of the
identification features of a product, thereby protecting the investment made by the
trademark owner); S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). The Senate Committee on Patents
reported two basic purposes of trademark legislation:
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a prod
uct bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a
trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the
product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates
and cheats.
Id.
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Act ensures that consumers get the product they want, while a
trademark owner's financial investment in the trademark is pro
tected. 15s Although the Lanham Act was enacted to unify national
trademark protection, it would be a mistake to believe the evolu
tion of trademark law ended with the passage of the Act. The func
tionality of trademarks will continue to evolve as economic
practices continue to evolve. The Lanham Act must therefore
evolve in step with the economy in order to continue to protect the
core purposes of trademark law.
The global popularity of the Internet has accelerated the eco
nomic evolution which began in the late nineteenth century with
the advent of the electric motor. 159 The ability of consumers to in
stantaneously and inexpensively access a nearly unlimited supply of
information has created a new wave of change in business. 16o Ship
ping goods east and west no longer means shipping across the Mis
sissippi River, but is more likely referring to exports destined for
East Asia or West Africa. 16I The rapid growth of international
trade has forced American courts to confront this second economic
evolution head-on.1 62
158. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3. "The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly
to this-as judges have repeated again and again-that one merchant shall not divert
customers from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the second."
Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928).
159. See Swann, supra note 2, at 586-87 (recognizing gains in productivity due to
the invention of the electric motor and railroads); Nicholas Khadder, National Basket
ball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 3, 3 (1998) (citing Michael
W. Carroll, Garbage In: Emerging Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial
Solicitations, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 233, 234 (1996» ("[T]he Internet has enabled
users to distribute and sell information very widely at a negligible marginal cost to the
distributor. ").
160. Swann, supra note 2, at 591 (finding that the past thirty years has resulted in
the production of more information than the previous 5,000); Leaffer, supra note 8, at 4
("Significant changes in the production and marketing of consumer goods have oc
curred since the 1970s.").
161. Between 1947 and 2004, U.S. exports rose from $14.4 billion to $807.5 bil
lion. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, CO
LONIAL TIMES TO 1970, PART 2, at 884 (1975) (U.S. export data from 1947); U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, U.S. TRADE IN GOODs-BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) BASIS VS.
CENSUS BASIS 1 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/
historicaUgoods.pdf (U.S. export data from 2004); see also Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Inter
national Intellectual Property Rights, the United States, and the People's Republic of
China, 13 TEMP. INT'L. & COMPo L.J. 1, 1-4 (1999) (discussing the position of intellec
tual property rights in international trade); Kenichi Ohmae, Managing in a Borderless
World, HARVARD Bus. REV., May-June 1989, at 153 (noting that the boundaries be
tween countries only exist on political maps).
162. Swann, supra note 2, at 587 (noting that cultural and economic changes had
outpaced trademark law at the turn of the twentieth century). Courts are continually
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The adage "it takes a life-time to build a good reputation but
only a second to destroy one" applies with equal force to trade
marks. Justice Holmes recognized this when he stated, "[a trade
mark] deals with a delicate matter that may be of great value but
that easily is destroyed, and therefore should be protected with cor
responding care."163 The delicate nature of trademarks demands a
level of protection that is available wherever a trademark serves its
function.
The Lanham Act attempts to protect a consumer's reliance on
a trademark while simultaneously protecting a company's financial
interest in the goodwill a trademark represents. 164 These two
objectives are interdependent-you cannot protect consumers with
out protecting business and you cannot protect business without
protecting consumers. When an infringing trademark misleads a
consumer, two harms actually occur: one to the consumer who pur
chased a product he did not want, and one to the registrant for the
loss of goodwill associated with his mark.165 Unlike tests developed
by other circuits, the McBee substantial effects test confronts extra
territorial infringement by protecting the core objectives that the
Lanham Act is designed to promote.
The McBee test focuses the jurisdictional question on the ef
fects of the misappropriation of the trademark and not on the loca
forced to interpret the law in an ever-reaching manner. See generally Jeffrey G. Miller,
Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L. REV.
409, 409-15 (2000) (discussing how evolutionary statutory interpretation keeps the
whole statutory application system vital and healthy). Although some call this type of
statutory interpretation "judicial activism," others see it as a necessary component in a
dynamic system of laws. [d.
163. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923) (comparing the monopoly
afforded a patent with that of a trademark).
164. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). The Senate Committee on Patents reported
two basic purposes of trademark legislation:
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a prod
uct bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a
trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the
product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates
and cheats.
Id.
165. Even if a consumer later finds out his purchase was a counterfeit, the value
of the registrant's trademark is still diminished. The consumer is now forced to meticu
lously inspect future purchases bearing that mark or face the risk of purchasing another
infringing product. This reduces the overall efficiency of the trademark. See Landes &
Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, supra note 53, at 275 (finding trademarks to
be a tool used to increase the efficiency of decision making).
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tion of the infringement. 166 McBee properly recognizes that in a
global economy, "absent a certain degree of extraterritorial en
forcement, [trademark] violators will either take advantage of inter
national coordination problems or hide in countries without
efficacious antitrust or trademark laws."167 The McBee test appro
priately shifts the focus of the analysis from the location of the in
fringement to whether the conduct has a substantial effect on U.S.
commerce by disregarding the citizenship and conflict of laws
prongs that other circuits consider.1 68
This analysis will demonstrate that the McBee substantial ef
fects test is the necessary and proper method for determining extra
territorial jurisdiction of the Lanham Act in a global economy
where products and information are not confined to limited territo
rial regions, but rather are produced, marketed, and sold in a global
arena. Courts applying the McBee substantial effects test would
not consider the citizenship of the infringer as a component of their
analysis. 169 Moreover, the McBee test eliminates the comity analy
sis from the initial inquiry, while still permitting courts to subse
quently use comity as a basis to decline jurisdictionPO By reducing
the jurisdictional test to the single factor of substantial effect on
commerce, McBee ensures that the Lanham Act's objectives of
preventing consumer confusion and protecting the financial invest
ment of the trademark owner are fulfilled in light of an ever-chang
ing global economyPl
A.

Citizenship of an Infringer is Irrelevant in a Global Economy
Because Products and Information Move Freely Between
Nations
A major flaw with the approaches of both the Second Circuit

166. See McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 121 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that juris
diction rests solely on a substantial effect being felt in the United States).
167. Id. at 119.
168. See id. at 121.
169. See supra Part 1.C.3.
170. Id.
171. The McBee test leaves unchanged the "substantial effects" prong of the Van
ity Fair test. Compare Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1956) (finding that there must be a substantial effect on U.S. commerce), with McBee,
417 F.3d at 121 (finding that jurisdiction rests solely on a substantial effect being felt in
the United States). The question of what level of activity amounts to a "substantial
effect" is outside the scope of this Note. Whatever that level of activity may be, it is
presumably the same under both approaches. See, e.g., Roger E. Schechter, The Case
for Limited Extraterritorial Reach of the Lanham Act, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 619, 628-31
(1997) (offering an example of what might amount to a substantial effect).
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and the Ninth Circuit is the weight given to the citizenship of the
infringer.l72 Using the citizenship of the infringer as an element in
the jurisdictional analysis places an artificial limitation on the asser
tion of jurisdiction that is based solely on geography. However, the
Lanham Act contains no such geographical limitation in its jurisdic
tionallanguage, nor can one be inferred from the Act's stated pur
pose. 173 The Act specifically provides that it is to be applied to "all
commerce" that may be regulated by Congress. 174 McBee properly
extends the current extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act, de
spite the fact that trademark protection has traditionally been lim
ited to territorial regions. 175
While "[t]he law of trademarks rests upon territoriality," the
territoriality upon which it rests is not defined by the political
boundaries upon which nations are divided. 176 Trademark rights
have only been limited territorially to the extent that the goodwill
generated by the trademark has been limited territoriallyY7 For
example, before the Lanham Act, a Boston producer of brand X
only received trademark protection in Massachusetts because the
products bearing the brand X mark were essentially confined to
Massachusetts. If the producer were to sell its goods in multiple
states, it would have to individually apply for trademark protection
in each state because brand X would be accumulating goodwill in
those states. Over time, technology enabled the maker of brand X
to profitably ship its goods to states located great distances from
Massachusetts. 178 When multiple brands began accumulating good
172. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642-43 (claiming jurisdiction only if the defendant is
a U.S. citizen); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428-29 (9th
Cir. 1977) (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th
Cir. 1976» (finding the citizenship of the parties to be of great importance).
173. See supra Part I.B.2.
174. Id.
175. Some scholars believe that when transactions become costless, the rule of
law will not matter because consumers will always have perfect information. See Eas
terbrook, supra note 45, at 2 (citing Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960».
176. ALTMAN, supra note 14, at § 20:26.
177. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark
Law from the Nation-State, 41 Hous. L. REV. 885, 895 (2004). A foreign infringer
would have little interest in copying a trademark if the consumers he was intent on
defrauding did not recognize the trademark. Without prior recognition of the trade
mark, the consumers would have no basis from which to recall past experiences with the
product. See LANDES & POSNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 52, at 167
(finding that consumers use trademarks based only on past experiences with the mark).
178. Although rail travel was a primary means of product movement, the creation
of the interstate highway system also forced courts to expand the territorial scope of
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will nationally, federal trademark protection was needed. The Lan
ham Act was the result of the need for national trademark
protection.
Similar to the expansion of goodwill on a national level, tech
nology has permitted the inexpensive global accumulation of good
will on a large scaleP9 In today's world economy, trademark
protections premised on geographical constraints are ineffective at
protecting a trademark's goodwill because goodwill is no longer
confined by geography.180 Anyone with a computer and Internet
access can view the latest trends from London to New York City
with a few simple clicks of the mouse. 181 In addition, modern ad
vertising media has eliminated a company's need to have a physical
presence in a country before information about the company's
products reaches consumers located in that country.182 In light of
the Internet and modern media, the McBee substantial effects test
furthers the core purposes of the Lanham Act by disregarding the
citizenship of an infringer.
1.

The Internet Knows No Citizenship

The Internet has had two significant impacts on trademarks.
First, information can instantaneously be spread without regard to
geographic boundaries.1 83 A website thereby allows consumers
around the world to quickly and inexpensively see a trademark. 184
trademark protection. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic
Commerce, 49 S.c. L. REV. 695, 715 (1998) (analogizing the interstate highway system
with the "information superhighway").
179. Sacoff, supra note 155, at 8.
180. Schechter, supra note 171, at 628-30 (explaining that foreign consumers will
have heard of American products long before the products are sold there); David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1367, 1370-71 (1996) (finding information moves quickly and inexpensively re
gardless of physical location).
181. Some commentators even view trademark law to be "a central, if not the
central, intellectual property issue in electronic commerce." Burk, supra note 178, at
696.
182. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM.
PETITION [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS] § 26:18 (West 2002) ("Modern ad
vertising media lend credence to applying the truism, 'It's a small world."'); Ohmae,
supra note 161, at 155 (stating that geographic barriers become irrelevant when infor
mation is easily accessible); see also Swann, supra note 2, at 591 (finding that the past
thirty years have resulted in the production of more information than the previous
5,000).
183. Johnson & Post, supra note 180, at 1370-71 (finding the cost and speed of
information exchange to be independent of physical location).
184. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227,1231 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("One
way to establish a presence on the Internet is by placing a web page, which is, ulti
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For businesses, this is both beneficial and detrimental. The business
receives the benefit of advertising to a large population at a low
cost, but must cede control as to where and when the consumer sees
the trademark. 185 Foreign infringers can take advantage of the In
ternet's lack of geographic borders by selling counterfeit products
before authentic products actually enter the market. When low
quality counterfeits end up in consumers' hands, the trademark suf
fers substantial harm. Consequently, by the time authentic prod
ucts enter the market, goodwill associated with the trademark may
be severely tarnished.
Second, the Internet has transformed the method by which
consumers purchase their goods. Electronic commerce has turned
the Internet into what can best be described as a gigantic mail-order
catalog, with buyers and sellers from all corners of the globe being
seamlessly connected. 186 However, since consumers are unable to
physically inspect a potential purchase, the trademark is the only
piece of information upon which a consumer can place his or her
reliance. 187 In this environment, trademarks assure product quality
for consumers.l 88 For the Lanham Act to protect a consumer's reli
ance in trademarks when purchasing goods in cyberspace, the Act
must ignore the citizenship of the infringer and focus solely on the
mately, a computer data file on a host operating a web server within a given domain
name.").
185. Recognized trademarks can use target marketing to focus advertising on a
specific market segment. See, e.g., Ross D. Petty et ai., Regulating Target Marketing and
Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. 1. RACE & L. 335, 434 (2003) (finding
that target marketing encourages campaigns that appeal to a specific group).
186. Burk, supra note 178, at 702. In 2001, U.S. companies sold over $1 trillion of
goods by electronic commerce. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, E-STATS 2 (2003), available
at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/papers/2001l2001estatstext.pdf.
187. Burk, supra note 178, at 702-03 (calling trademark reputation "critical" to
online commerce). There are three basic classifications of goods that consumers
purchase both on- and off-line: inspection goods, experience goods, and credence
goods. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 284-85 (1987) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, TORT LAW]. "Inspection"
goods are items that a consumer will quickly determine the quality of through inspec
tion; an example would be fresh fruit. Id. at 284. "Experience" goods are items where
quality is determined through use rather than touch; an example would be a sealed box
of cereal. Id. "Credence" goods are items that have hidden attributes of quality that
may take a while to become known; an example would be an automobile. Id. at 284-85.
Trademarks tend to be most important for credence goods as these goods typically have
a higher degree of complexity. Burk, supra note 178, at 702-03. Experience goods are
bought based on trademarks because of the efficiency of doing so. [d.
188. See Burk, supra note 178, at 703. Between 1967 and 1992, worldwide trade
mark registrations grew from 400,000 to 1,200,000. Leaffer, supra note 8, at 5.
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effects of the infringing act. 189 The McBee substantial effects test,
therefore, properly disregards citizenship as a basis for asserting ex
traterritorial jurisdiction while the other tests incorrectly rely on cit
izenship as a factor in determining jurisdiction.
2.

Modern Media

The Internet is not the only way trademarks find their way into
the minds of foreign consumers. Corporate marketers pay huge
fees to have products advertised during sporting events like the
Olympics and the games of major American professional
leagues. 190 These events are taking on a decidedly international
feel, mainly due to the influx of international superstars to the
American sports of baseball, basketball, and hockey,191
Consumers in foreign countries undoubtedly see their favorite
players on television and in print. In addition, they see the mastery
of American advertising at work. 192 Trademarks grace everything
from the shoes the athletes wear, to the beverages they drink. Be
cause of this internationalization of media, it is nearly impossible to
confine trademarks to territorial boundaries,193 Goodwill associ
ated with a trademark is being built up or destroyed long before the
product ever reaches the foreign market. 194 McBee provides regis
trants with the ability to bring suit against foreign infringers who
destroy that goodwill.
3.

Expansion of the Idea of Citizenship

District courts have attempted to alleviate the harsh effects of
189. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). "The law of unfair trade comes down
very nearly to this-as judges have repeated again and again-that one merchant shall
not divert customers from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the
second." Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928).
190. See, e.g., Stephen McKelvey & John Grady, An Analysis of the Ongoing
Global Efforts to Combat Ambush Marketing: Will Corporate Marketers "Take" the
Gold in Greece?, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 191,191 (2004) (stating corporate mar
keters pay an average of $40 million to be an Olympic sponsor).
191. Dustin C. Lane, From Mao to Yao: A New Game Plan for China in the Era of
Basketball Globalization, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 127, 131-33 (2004) (providing sta
tistics on the international athletic talent entering American sports).
192. See Swann, supra note 2, at 605-06 (citing KEVIN LANE KELLER, STRATEGIC
BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING, AND MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 32
(1998» (stating that brand proliferation has forced advertisers to turn to nontraditional
advertising like event sponsorship).
193. See Schechter, supra note 171, at 628; Leaffer, supra note 8, at 4.
194. Schechter, supra note 171, at 628-29 (stating that such harm to goodwill re
sults in lost foreign sales and lost domestic sales).
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the Vanity Fair citizenship prong by extending the traditional notion
of citizenship.195 Courts have created the fiction of "constructive
citizenship" as a means to avoid the mechanical application of the
test's citizenship prong. 196 In addition, courts have also used do
mestic subsidiaries as an illusory means to satisfy Vanity Fair's citi
zenship requirement. 197 These actions, however, amount to a legal
fiction that is nothing more than a guise for the erosion of the citi
zenship prong. McBee better serves the judiciary by eliminating the
need for courts to mold and shape facts in order to reach a just
outcome. Under McBee, a court can focus on whether the effects
were substantial rather than looking to who the infringer is. In
other words, by removing the citizenship of the infringer from the
analysis, the McBee test focuses on protecting the goodwill associ
ated with a trademark wherever that goodwill might go.
B.

McBee Conforms with the General Expansion of the
Extraterritorial Application of u.s. Law in Light of a
Global Economy

The McBee substantial effects test provides the Lanham Act
with the same level of extraterritorial jurisdiction that is afforded to
other unfair competition statutes.1 98 The current trend in the judi
ciary is to give so-called "market statutes" increasing extraterrito
rial application, while limiting the extraterritorial effect of so-called
"nonmarket statutes."199 Market statutes are primarily concerned
with the protection of market interests and ensuring a level playing
field. 2 °O Examples include unfair competition laws and securities
law. 201 Nonmarket statutes, such as environmental protection stat
195. Indeed, citizenship takes on less importance in this era of frequent fliers
where individuals are encouraged to move freely around the globe. Chuck Y. Gee,
Aviation and Tourism: The Traveling Public, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 1,2 (1991) ("Th[e] growth
of travel and tourism has generally reflected economic, social, and political trends
favoring travel consumption ....").
196. See, e.g., Calvin Klein Indus. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78, 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
197. See, e.g., Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Houbigant, Inc. v. Dev. Specialists, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 208, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
198. See Diggins, supra note 7, at 205 (recognizing that uniformity in unfair com
petition laws is essential to preserve commerce).
199. Turley, supra note 62, at 601.
200. See id. (noting that market statutes like antitrust and securities law consist
ently get extraterritorial application). Market statutes ensure a level playing field by
providing fair competition between businesses and consumers. See id. and accompany
ing note.
201. Id.
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utes and employment regulations, protect other rights and inter
ests. 202 The McBee test eliminates comity considerations from the
jurisdictional analysis in a manner consistent with other market
statues.
1.

Nonmarket Statutes are Not Applied Extraterritorially

Trademarks are a form of intellectual property because they
are often conceived deep in the minds of their creators, in much the
same manner as writings and inventions. However, trademarks dif
fer from other forms of intellectual property because of the func
tion trademarks serve in society.203 Writings and inventions are
protected by copyrights and patents through statute,z04 and benefit
society by "promoting the progress of science and the useful
arts."205 Copyrights and patents-traditional non-market stat
utes-receive protection which is limited territorially because the
society those laws are designed to benefit is limited to the territorial
United States. 206 Trademarks, on the other hand, receive statutory
protection because of the economic function they serve. 207 While
202. Id.
203. LANDES & POSNER, INTELLEcrUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 52, at 166.
204. The statutory protection for authors and inventors is under authority granted
by the Patent and Copyright Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
205. PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLEC·
TUAL PROPERTY 36, 110-11 (1994) (stating patents are governed by the Patent Act of
1952 and copyrights are governed by the Copyright Act of 1976); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries").
206. See Leaffer, supra note 8, at 4 Uustifying poor patent enforcement as a
means of economic growth); David R. Toraya, Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign
Copyright Infringment Actions-An Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 COR·
NELL L. REV. 1165, 1171-72 n.41 (1985) (noting that patents and copyrights serve a
compelling public interest by providing the marketplace with "artistic expression and
technological innovation" while trademarks simply provide a product identifier). See
generally Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'n Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.
1994) (noting that the United States is member to two international treaties that afford
"national treatment" to American copyright holders in member countries).
207. See Turley, supra note 62, at 601 (labeling the Lanham Act a "market stat
ute"). Trademarks also allow businesses to command premium prices for trademarked
products. See James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation:
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,35 CATH. U. L.
REV. 433, 437-39 (1986). This phenomenon is probably most prevalent in the health
care industry where brand-name drugs are heavily advertised and priced significantly
higher then their generic, unadvertised counterparts. Jd. (examining the effects of ge
neric drugs on the pharmaceutical industry); Brown, supra note 46, at 1173 (comparing
the price of advertised brands of aspirin with wholesale prices). But see LANDES &
POSNER, INTELLEcrUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 52, at 173-74 (arguing that con
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copyrights and patents enhance our cultural well-being, trademarks
serve to differentiate competing products and prevent confusion
among consumers. 208 Thus, unlike copyrights and patents, trade
mark protection should transcend the invisible borders of our coun
try and protect the interests of the mark holder in relation to an
economic market, not a political territory.209
The Supreme Court has consistently been unwilling to give
nonmarket statutes extraterritorial application. 210 This reluctance
is founded on the idea that the rights and social policies that
nonmarket statutes further are limited in geographic scope to the
political borders of the policy makers.211 The Court has held that
statutes making general references to foreign commerce, which lack
"any specific language" expressly allowing extraterritorial applica
tion, cannot be applied to foreign conduct. 212 In addition, "limited,
boilerplate 'commerce' language" is insufficient to evidence con
gressional intent for extraterritorial application. 213 However noble
it would be to impose U.S. employment law on third world coun
sumers pay a premium price for the assurance that the brand name product will be
properly manufactured).
208. Although trademarks' main benefit is realized though lower search costs,
trademarks do have the ability to enhance our culture in a way similar to that of an
author or inventor. LANDES & POSNER, INTELLEcruAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 52,
at 168-69. Trademarks, similar to writings and inventions, are often made by creating
new words or symbols, or creating a unique shape that becomes associated with your
product. [d. This benefits society by enlarging the overall "stock" of words and de
signs. Id. Many trademarks also provide consumers with an internal benefit though the
"intrinsic pleasingness" of saying or hearing the mark. Landes, The Economics of
Trademark Law, supra note 53, at 273 (1988).
209. 1 CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
(West Group) § 4.31 (May 2005) (stating the "relevant market" for unfair competition
purposes is dictated by where the harm is felt); Burk, supra note 178, at 711-12 (discuss
ing the determination of the relevant market, which must be based on consumers, not
geography).
210. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,252-53 (1991); Mc
Culloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) (find
ing the National Labor Relations Act was not intended to apply overseas).
211. Turley, supra note 62, at 601.
212. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19-20 (finding the National Labor Relations Act was
not intended to apply overseas). The National Labor Relations Act provides, in part:
The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or com
munication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or
any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the
same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of
Columbia or any foreign country.
29 U.S.c. § 152 (2000) (emphasis added).
213. EEOC, 499 U.S. at 252-53 (quoting New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm,
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tries, doing so would violate all traditional notions of sovereignty.
It is for policy makers in those countries to determine the social
policies of those countries.
2.

Market Statutes like the Lanham Act Receive Far
Reaching Extraterritorial Application

Unlike non-market statutes, market statutes are only effective
if they can regulate the entire relevant market and therefore receive
extraterritorial application to the extent the relevant market is af
fected. 214 For example, unfair-competition laws have consistently
been applied to conduct occurring abroad because harms and
wrongs committed in far-away places that go unchecked can have a
profound impact on domestic activity.215 Therefore, the Court
reads the jurisdictional language of market statutes like the Lan
ham Act broadly in order to provide the protections Congress in
tended in light of an ever-changing economic market.2 16
3.

McBee Eliminates Comity Because it is No Longer
Applicable to Trademark Infringement in a
Global Market

In formulating the McBee test, the First Circuit drew strong

analogies between the policies and objectives underlying antitrust
268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925». The boilerplate commerce language in dispute in Chisholm was
from the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which provides that
[e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any
of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territo
ries, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories,
or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any
foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce.
45 U.S.c. § 51 (2000) (emphasis added).
214. Senator Metzenbaum clearly explained the purpose behind extraterritorial
application of unfair competition laws when he introduced the International Fair Com
petition Act of 1993. The Senator stated, "[u]nfortunately, we cannot impose our high
regard for fair competition on the rest of the world. However, [we can] help encourage
fairness and strong competition in international markets by preventing foreign compa
nies based in countries that do not foster free and open competition from exploiting
American consumers and producers." 139 CONGo REC, 936 (1993) (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum).
215. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially). The Second Circuit was sitting as the last
court of appeals because the United States Supreme Court did not have the required
quorum. Id. at 421; see also Turley, supra note 62, at 601.
216. See Miller, supra note 162, at 409-16. "Evolutionary statutory interpretation
[keeps] the [whole] statutory application system ... vital and healthy." Id. at 415.
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laws and trademark laws. 217 Antitrust and trademark laws are both
based on unfair-competition principles and are, therefore, both con
sidered market statutes. 218 As market statutes, the same justifica
tions exist for giving each extraterritorial application. 219 While the
Supreme Court has not examined the extraterritorial reach of the
Lanham Act for nearly sixty years, it recently revisited the extrater
ritorial reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act in light of changing eco
nomic conditions.
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Supreme
Court affirmed and modified long-standing precedent on the extra
territorial application of the Sherman Act.220 First, the Court reit
erated the well-established principle that the Sherman Act applies
to foreign conduct "that was meant to produce and did in fact pro
duce some substantial effect in the United States."221 Next, the
Court noted that "Congress expressed no view on the question
whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever decline
to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity."222
The Court, however, remarked that, while not at issue in this case,
applying comity as a part of the initial jurisdictional question rather
than as a basis to decline to exercise the jurisdiction that it pos
sessed would be against prior Sherman Act jurisprudence.223 The
Supreme Court's elimination of comity from extraterritorial Sher
217. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit
also based its Lanham Act balancing test on its prior Sherman Act jurisdictional test.
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428-29 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1976».
218. Turley, supra note 62, at 601. As one commentator noted, "[rlather than
siblings sharing a room, the two bodies of law are more like parents running a house
hold. As with parents looking out for the best interest of the children, the guiding
principle is the best interest of consumers." Willard K. Tom, Deputy Dir., Bureau of
Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Licensing and Antitrust: Common Goals and Un
common Problems, Address Before the American Conference Institute, 9th National
Conference on Licensing Intellectual Property (Oct. 12, 1998) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/aciippub.htm) (discussing the similarities between in
tellectual property and antitrust laws).
219. McBee, 417 F.3d at 119 (finding antitrust decisions to be a useful guide).
220. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1-7 (2000); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
221. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 796; see also United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (establishing the principle that there must
be "some effect" on imports or exports).
222. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 798 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at
13 (1982» (stating that if a court has subject-matter jurisdiction it could then look to
comity).
223. Id. at 797 n.24. The Court did not directly address this question because the
parties conceded jurisdiction. Id.
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man Act analysis supports McBee's elimination of comity from ex
traterritorial Lanham Act analysis.
As stated in McBee, the problem with using comity as a factor
in determining jurisdiction is that it causes "the scope of Congres
sional intent and power ... [to] turn on the existence and meaning
of foreign law."224 However, as the Supreme Court has noted,
lower courts lack the necessary information and are generally "ill
equipped" for balancing sovereign interests. 225 Just as lower courts
. are ill equipped to balance comity factors for Sherman Act pur
poses, they are also ill equipped to balance comity factors for Lan
ham Act purposes.
Indeed, even the Second Circuit has moved away from the
mechanical application of its Vanity Fair comity prong in order to
allow for greater extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act. 226
The court found that Congress intended the Lanham Act "to be
used as a shield against foreign uses that have significant trade
mark-impairing effects upon American commerce."227 A comity
analysis will, in most instances, deny protection to trademark hold
ers against misappropriation of their marks in foreign countries. 228
The McBee substantial effects test properly eliminates any type
of comity balancing from the jurisdictional analysis. In an era when
the world is moving towards "more open, procompetitive trade,"229
vehicles for fair competition like trademarks must be given far
reaching application. 230 The range of protections afforded in differ
ent countries represents a wide spectrum of political and economic
224. McBee, 417 F.3d at 121.
225. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See generally Michael G. McKinnon, Federal Judicial and Legislative Jurisdiction Over
Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond the
Timberlane/Restatement Comity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219 (1994) (analyzing
the adoption of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Hartford Fire Ins. Co.).
226. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that
if the Vanity Fair test was mechanically applied to the facts before the court, the Lan
ham Act could not be applied and American consumers would be harmed).
227. /d.
228. Id.
229. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries:
An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 457 (2001).
230. Id. (stating that developing nations must modify their intellectual property
laws to keep up with the move toward procompetitive trade); see also Keith E. Maskus,
Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
471,478 (2000) [hereinafter Maskus, Economic Development] (finding that developing
countries provide insufficient resources to enforcement).
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influences.23 1 In addition, foreign nations may be "unwilling[] to
pay the high costs of administering an effective [statutory] system
and [unable] to manage the complex legal and technical issues such
a system entails. "232

4.

McBee Protects Foreign Interests by Only Asserting
Jurisdiction When There Is a Substantial Effect
on U.S. Commerce

Critics of far-reaching U.S. trademark laws argue that the
United States is not "the global court of commerce" and the extra
territorial application of the Lanham Act must respect foreign in
terests. 233 However, McBee recognizes that Congress has little
interest in protecting foreign or American consumers from trade
mark infringement where there are not substantial effects felt in the
United States. 234 It is only when a substantial effect is felt in the
United States that a court may assert jurisdiction. Until foreign na
tions provide necessary protections through regulation and enforce
ment, far-reaching extraterritorial enforcement is necessary to
prevent violators from "hid[ing] in countries without efficacious ...
trademark laws, thereby avoiding legal authority."235 When a sub
stantial effect is felt in the Unites States, and "there is in fact a true
conflict between domestic and foreign law," courts may use comity
considerations as a means to decline to exercise jurisdiction. 236
CONCLUSION

When the Lanham Act was passed, "trade [was] no longer lo
cal, but [was] national."237 Today, trade is no longer national, but is
international. The evolution of the law must continue to reflect the
231. Maskus, Economic Development, supra note 230, at 478.
232. Id. (finding that developing countries provide insufficient resources for en
forcement and that the "[l]east-developed countries ... have little intellectual property
to protect").
233. 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 182, at § 29:58.
234. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005).
235. Id. at 119.
236. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (quoting So
ciete Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part». A true
conflict only exists where a person subject to regulation by two countries cannot comply
with the laws of both. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415,
cmt. e (1987); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 u.s. at 799 (finding no conflict exists
where a person can comply with both sets of laws).
237. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946).
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evolution of the economy.238 The fundamental purposes behind
protecting fair competition are thwarted if infringements that occur
abroad and create a substantial effect in the United States but is not
remedied. The Vanity Fair test was sufficient when international
trade was still in its infancy and not commonplace. However, inter
national commerce has matured into an everyday reality, causing
the Vanity Fair test to outlive its usefulness. The McBee substantial
effects test represents a better form of trademark protection for an
international economy. With global, international trade must come
the ability of U.S. courts to regulate on a global, international level.
McBee permits such regulation, while simultaneously limiting the
reach of the Lanham Act to those instances where the United
States has a substantial interest.
Finally, the McBee substantial effects test mirrors the Supreme
Court's analysis for extraterritorial application of the Sherman An
titrust Act. Just like the Sherman Act, the Lanham Act requires
use of a substantial effects test to determine subject-matter jurisdic
tion in order to promote the goals of the Act. By eliminating the
citizenship and conflict with foreign law prongs, McBee eliminates
the need for courts to resolve matters of unfamiliar foreign law.
When foreign trademark infringement causes a substantial effect in
the United States, the Lanham Act's protections should be trig
gered and a remedy should be available, regardless of the citizen
ship of the infringer or comity considerations.

Brendan 1. Witherell

238.

See supra note 9.

